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Prolonged Consensual Cohabitation Negates False Promise of Marriage Rape Charge: Supreme Court Quashes FIR

  • Writer: Kaustav Chowdhury
    Kaustav Chowdhury
  • 13 hours ago
  • 2 min read

In a judgment delivered in May 2026, the Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings against a man accused of rape on the basis of a false promise of marriage, holding that prolonged consensual cohabitation negates the charge under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The bench of Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Manmohan set aside the Bombay High Court's refusal to quash the FIR, emphasising that a consensual relationship that sours cannot be retroactively criminalised as rape merely because the man later refused to marry the woman.

The Legal Distinction Between Breach of Promise and Rape

Indian criminal law recognises that consent obtained by misconception of fact is not valid consent. Section 376 IPC (now Section 64 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) criminalises sexual intercourse without consent or with consent obtained through fraud. However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that not every breach of a promise to marry constitutes rape. The critical distinction lies between a false promise (where the accused never intended to marry from the inception of the relationship) and a breach of promise (where the intention to marry existed initially but failed due to subsequent circumstances). Only the former vitiates consent and amounts to the offence of rape.

Facts of the Present Case

The complainant and the accused were in a relationship that continued consensually for approximately four years. During this period, they travelled together, stayed at hotels, maintained regular communication, and the complainant made voluntary financial transfers to the accused. The complainant's divorce from her previous marriage was finalised only during the course of the relationship. No complaint was filed until the accused refused to marry her, at which point she alleged that the entire relationship had been conducted under a false promise of marriage. The FIR was registered under Section 376 IPC.

The Supreme Court's Analysis

The Supreme Court found that the prolonged duration of the consensual relationship, the voluntary nature of the physical intimacy, the financial transfers from the complainant to the accused, and the delayed lodging of the complaint all indicated that the relationship was not founded on fraudulent consent. The Court observed that it would be a folly to treat every breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person under Section 376. Unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage and that the promise was false from inception, consent is not vitiated. The Court quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings.

Key Takeaways for Criminal Law Practice

This judgment reinforces safeguards against the misuse of rape laws in consensual adult relationships that fail. For defence counsel, the ruling provides clear parameters: the duration of the relationship, the conduct of both parties during the relationship, the timing of the complaint, and the presence or absence of fraudulent intent at inception are all relevant factors that courts must examine. For investigating officers and prosecutors, the case underscores the need to carefully evaluate whether the essential ingredient of false promise from inception exists before proceeding with charges under Section 376 IPC or Section 64 BNS. The law protects victims of genuine sexual fraud but does not criminalise the failure of romantic relationships between consenting adults.

 
 
 

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