Bombay High Court Orders Deletion of Identified Content but Refuses Blanket Monitoring of Future Posts
Background and Facts
An order against a platform is easy to obtain in form and hard to obtain in substance, because the width of the direction decides whether it can be obeyed at all. The Bombay High Court has directed the deletion of specifically identified material published in breach of an existing injunction, and has refused the wider relief sought alongside it, declining blanket monitoring of future posts and the suspension or deletion of the accounts the material came from. The order was made by Justice Gauri Godse on September 29, 2026.
The suit is a defamation action brought by Serum Institute of India, in which Adar Poonawalla is also a plaintiff, over content asserting that the company's Covid vaccine caused deaths. On June 5, 2023 the Court granted a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from publishing content of that kind and requiring the existing material to be taken down. The present application arose because one of the defendants, Yohan Tengra, put up a further video after that injunction was in place.
Two things followed. The Court issued show cause notices asking the defendants why action should not be initiated against them for breach of the injunction, and it directed the platform hosting the fresh video to remove and delete it. What the Court declined to do is the part worth reading closely.
Key Legal Issue
How far a civil court may go once material it has already found objectionable keeps reappearing: whether it may require a platform to stop future uploads of similar content and to suspend the accounts responsible, or whether its directions must stay tied to material the court has itself seen and ruled upon.
What the Court Directed
The operative direction was confined to the identified video. The broader prayers were refused. Those prayers sought the automatic removal of future content of the same character and the suspension or deletion of the defendants' accounts. The reason given was that a direction of that width would leave the platform deciding for itself what falls inside the order, and an intermediary is not an adjudicator or a censor of what is lawful.
The effect is to put the burden back where it started. The plaintiff must return to court with each fresh piece of material. That is slower than a standing direction, and it is also the only version of the order a platform can obey without exercising a judgment that belongs to the court.
Why the Refusal Matters More Than the Direction
Takedown directions in matters of this kind are now routine, and a plaintiff who has one tends to ask for the obvious extension: a direction covering anything similar that appears later. This order explains why the extension is not available. A direction must concern identifiable material that the court has considered and found objectionable or unlawful, because that is the only thing the court has decided.
Drafting follows from that. A prayer framed as the removal of the listed material and all similar content invites the court either to refuse it wholesale or to grant something narrower. Scheduling the specific locations, and returning with a supplementary schedule when more appears, is the slower route and the one that produces an enforceable order.
Where Order XXXIX Rule 2A Fits
Breach of an injunction carries its own consequence, which is separate from a fresh takedown. Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that in case of disobedience of an injunction granted or an order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2, or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted, the court may order the property of the person guilty of the disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order that person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months. No attachment under the rule remains in force for more than one year, at the end of which, if the disobedience or breach continues, the attached property may be sold and the court may award compensation to the injured party out of the proceeds.
Rules 1 and 2 are the source of the injunction itself. Rule 1 deals with temporary injunctions where property in suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated, or where the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff. Rule 2 permits a temporary injunction in a suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind. An order restraining further publication in a defamation action sits under Rule 2, and a fresh upload after it is made engages Rule 2A.
So the two limbs of the order do different work. The show cause notices are addressed to the persons who disobeyed, with attachment and detention as the sanction. The removal direction is addressed to the platform, and is remedial rather than penal.
How This Sits With the Safe Harbour
Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 exempts an intermediary from liability for third party information, data or communication links made available or hosted by it. Section 79(2) confines the exemption to an intermediary whose function is limited to providing access to a communication system over which third party information is transmitted or temporarily stored, which does not initiate the transmission, select the receiver or modify the information, and which observes due diligence and the guidelines prescribed by the Central Government.
Section 79(3)(b) withdraws the exemption where the intermediary, on receiving actual knowledge that material on its resource is being used to commit an unlawful act, fails to remove or disable access to it expeditiously without vitiating the evidence. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India the Supreme Court read that requirement down, holding that actual knowledge means an intimation in the form of a court order or a notification by the appropriate government, and not a complaint from a private party.
Read against that, the order is coherent rather than cautious. A court order is what supplies actual knowledge, which is the practical reason for obtaining one. For the same reason the order has to identify the material, because an intermediary asked to work out for itself what else is covered is being asked to do the very thing a platform cannot be required to do.
Practice Notes
In practice, the order changes how relief against a platform should be framed and resisted:
Schedule the material, do not describe it: A list of the specific locations complained of survives. A formula covering similar or future content does not, and risks the narrowing of the whole prayer.
Plead the breach and the removal separately: Disobedience of an existing injunction is an Order XXXIX Rule 2A matter against the persons bound by it. Removal is a direction to the host. The reliefs run on different footings and against different respondents.
Expect account level relief to be refused: Suspension or deletion of an account is not a direction about identified material, and a plaintiff who makes it the centrepiece may lose the removal direction's clarity along with it.
Treat the order as the source of actual knowledge: Section 79(3)(b) as read down is engaged by a court order. The order should therefore be drawn so that the material is identifiable on its face, because that is what the host will act on.
Build the record of repetition: Each fresh upload after an injunction is evidence on the Rule 2A application. The dates and the sequence matter more than the volume.
Key Provisions Discussed
Order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Temporary injunctions where property in suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated, or where the plaintiff is threatened with dispossession.
Order XXXIX Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Temporary injunction in a suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind.
Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Consequences of disobedience. Attachment of the property of the person guilty of it and detention in the civil prison for up to three months, with no attachment in force beyond one year.
Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000: Exemption from liability of an intermediary for third party information, its conditions, and its withdrawal where the intermediary fails to act expeditiously on actual knowledge.
Case Details
Case: Serum Institute of India v. Yohan Tengra
Court: High Court of Bombay
Judge: Justice Gauri Godse
Date of Order: September 29, 2026
Earlier Injunction: June 5, 2023, restraining publication of the content complained of and requiring existing posts to be taken down
Directed: Removal and deletion of the identified video by the platform hosting it, and show cause notices to the defendants on why action should not be initiated for breach of the injunction
Refused: Automatic removal of future content of the same character, and suspension or deletion of the defendants' accounts
Sources and References
Bombay HC Directs X Corp To Remove Fresh Video Against Adar Poonawalla, Issues Show-Cause Notices
Content posted against Serum Institute of India prima facie defamatory: Bombay HC
Order XXXIX Rules 1, 2, 2A and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India: the reading down of actual knowledge
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XXXIX Rules 1, 2 and 2A; Information Technology Act, 2000, Section 79
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult a qualified legal professional for advice specific to their circumstances.
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